Iraq, Chilcot and learning from experience

We seem to be living through one of those moments in history when it’s difficult to process all the things that are happening across the globe. 

And yet somebody has to do so. Our political leaders, of course – but they in turn depend on advice from policy officials. One of the key recent learning experiences for such policy professionals was the UK’s intervention in Iraq, 2003-2009. I was asked to chair a panel discussion a few weeks ago about what we had learned from the subsequent official inquiry, widely known as ‘Chilcot’ after the inquiry chairman, Sir John Chilcot. 

The Inquiry’s Report was published in 2016. It didn’t pull its punches. Our discussion covered what we felt were its key takeaways. 

First, and perhaps most importantly, that developing policy on these issues is hard. International security policy presents many ‘wicked‘ problems, not least because of factors outside our control. And while we should all be thankful that we live and work in a democracy, regular changes of government don’t necessarily make for the good long-term policymaking that international issues so desperately need. Recognising these complexities and the absence of simple solutions is a good place to start. 

Second, the learning from Chilcot had been injected into the policy mainstream with reasonable success. At the same time, we can’t let the lessons learned become an orthodoxy that in time detaches itself from the problems they’re supposed to address. Learning has to be constantly renewed. And paradoxically, part of the learning is that something that didn’t work last time might work next in a different context. 

Third, and equally important, is understanding the issue you’re getting involved with. That might seem obvious, but one of the key observations of the Chilcot Report was that the UK and US governments had only the most superficial understanding of the place into which they were about to make a profound investment (and where, arguably, they were about to change the course of international politics to an extent still felt today).

Understanding extends to having some sense of where decisions are likely to lead, and what the associated ‘exit strategy’ might comprise. This can be a primary discriminator between success or failure. The policy maker needs a reasonable, pragmatic idea of where things are supposed to be heading, if for no better reason than recognising when they’re going off course. And a Plan B and Plan C in case Plan A proves inadequate.

One of the key products of the post-Chilcot work across the national security community was the ‘Chilcot Checklist’: a list of ten questions the policy maker should ask themselves during the development and implementation of policy. It’s not supposed to provide the answers, but rather a framework for thinking. You’ll find it in the MOD’s publication, The Good Operation. Another excellent product from the post-Chilcot work was the Royal College of Defence Studies’ ‘Making Strategy Better’ publication.

 

Finally, and just maybe most importantly, it’s essential to recognise – duh! – that we are human beings, with all our inherent psychological and behavioural limitations. 

Strong personalities are needed to take difficult decisions, but they need also actively to seek good counsel and reasonable challenge. Not doing so is really problematic. We were reminded of football manager Brian Clough’s famous quote about hearing other opinions: ‘We talk about it for 20 minutes and then we decide I was right’. Effective leaders need to be clear-minded, but have humility.

It can be difficult to speak truth unto power. Over and above egos, and the need to take account of the particular personalities at the top at any particular time, there are other obstacles. A more junior official, mindful of their career progression, might not want to come across as a member of the ‘awkward squad’ – it can be scary, putting up your hand to dissent from a prevailing view. There might not be sufficient diversity of thought around the senior leader to offer the challenge needed. The way meetings are set up, from their agendas to their seating plans, might not facilitate access to diversity of thought. 

Fixing these issues puts you on the path to a balanced challenge function, and consequently, better decisions. It’s not rocket science; there’s a simple guide to reasonable challenge (for seniors to invite in challenge, and supporting staff to offer it) at the back of The Good Operation publication, mentioned above. 

We all recognise these things, but the supertanker can sometimes be slow to turn. Reminding ourselves every so often of what we have learned, particularly from monumental public inquiries such as Chilcot, is essential in ensuring we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past. 

This blog is based on one published a few weeks ago on the Civil Service Policy Profession website. The original, which has links to other Policy Profession events and resources, can be found here.